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Abstract—The exponential data growth in intelligent environ-
ments fueled by the Internet of Things is not only a major push
behind distributed programming frameworks for big data, it
also magnifies security and privacy concerns about unauthorized
access to data. The huge diversity and the streaming nature
of data raises the demand for new enabling technologies for
scalable access control that can deal with the growing velocity,
volume and variety of volatile data. This paper presents SparkXS,
an attribute-based access control solution with the ability to
define access control policies on streaming latent data, i.e. hid-
den information made explicit through data analytics, such as
aggregation, transformation and filtering. Experimental results
show that SparkXS can enforce access control in a horizontally
scalable way with minimal performance overheads.
Keywords-access control, streaming data, intelligent applica-
tions, Internet of Things, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligent environments are evolving to open ended large
scale and dynamic network infrastructures fueled by low cost,
connected and wirelessly communicating devices that collect
data, relay information to one another, process the information
collaboratively, and take actions in an autonomic way. Process-
ing usually takes place at aggregation points in the network
or in the cloud. However, as the classical store-and-analyze-
later approach does not scale well with the exponential data
growth of these connected devices, being able to make sense of
large volumes of data with uncertain veracity and value from
a variety of sources in real-time becomes a key differentiator.
Orthogonal to these non-functional concerns are a mul-
titude of security and privacy challenges caused by unre-
stricted access to high volumes of sensitive data. In distributed
programming frameworks, such as Hadoop MapReduce [1],
Yahoo’s S4 [2], Twitter’s Storm project [3], Mahout [4],
Dremel [5], a cluster of distributed and parallel processes
manipulate, map and reduce huge scattered data sets to useful
information. Enforcing who has access to this volatile but
possibly sensitive data is an increasingly daunting concern.
Encryption at the network level, but also in the storage tier
(also known as at-rest encryption) can help ensure that data is
not disclosed to or modified by unauthorized people. Cloudera
and Intel are collaborating under the umbrella of Project
Rhino1 on such protection capabilities at the data cell level
for Apache Hadoop. However, in a streaming context where
1https://github.com/intel-hadoop/project-rhino/
the lifetime of data is limited, managing the visibility of
volatile data with encryption is obviously not without a non-
negligible computational overhead. Therefore, our focus in this
work is on policy-based access control mechanisms for data
processed by distributed data processing frameworks similar
to the aforementioned ones.
The main contribution in this work is SparkXS, an attribute-
based access control solution with the ability to define access
control policies not only on regular batch data, but also on
streaming and especially latent data, i.e. hidden information
made explicit through aggregation, transformation and filter-
ing, with support for lazy policy evaluation. Our software
solution is built on top of the Apache Spark [6] framework
and its extensions for stream processing. We evaluate the
performance of SparkXS in the frame of an urban computing
use case. Experimental results show that SparkXS can enforce
access control in a horizontally scalable way with minimal
performance overheads.
After reviewing related work in section II, we discuss the
basic foundations of SparkXS in section III and its access
control extensions in section IV. In section V we analyze
the feasibility and performance of SparkXS in a distributed
deployment. We conclude in section VI summarizing the main
insights and identifying possible topics for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section reviews various related works in the domain
of access control for distributed systems and state-of-practice
distributed data processing frameworks. With this overview of
related work, our goal is to clarify the gap that SparkXS aims
to bridge.
The data explosion of the Internet of Things is often
linked with the Big Data paradigm. MapReduce [7] − and its
Hadoop [1] implementation − is a software framework and
programming model that allows developers to write programs
that process massive amounts of unstructured data in parallel
across a distributed cluster of computers. The shortcomings
and drawbacks of batch-oriented data processing have been
widely recognized as many applications are in need of real-
time [8], [9] and in-stream processing capabilities [10]. This
concept got a lot of traction with various distributed event
stream processing (ESP) engines emerging. Yahoo’s S4 [2]
and Twitter’s Storm project [3] were among the first to attract
a lot of attention. Also Google acknowledged the limitations
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Fig. 1. Conceptual decomposition of streaming big data with Spark
of MapReduce, with its MillWheel [11] framework and pro-
gramming model dedicated to fault-tolerant stream processing
at Internet scale. Spark [6] is another state-of-practice software
solution for large-scale data processing.
Access control is an important information protection mech-
anism, with the most common, oldest, and most well-known
identity-based access control models being Discretionary Ac-
cess Control (DAC), Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [12], [13], [14]. Recently,
there has been growing interest in Attribute Based Access
Control (ABAC) [15] to overcome the limitations of the
aforementioned access control models. The ABAC model
makes decisions on permitting or denying access by relying on
attributes of subjects, resources, actions, and the environment.
It allows for resource owners to grant access to unanticipated
users as long as they have attributes that meet certain criteria.
The latest trend in access control models is Risk-Adaptive
Access Control (RAdAC) (RAdAC) [16], [17] where access
decisions depend on dynamic risk assessments. In policy-based
access control, such as Ponder [18], Rei and KAoS [19], and
the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
specification [20], regulation of access to protected resources
is expressed external to the applications as high-level rules
that define who has access to what resources under what
conditions.
Apache Hadoop is without a doubt one of the most popular
big data platforms, but it was initially conceived for a trusted
environment and not designed with security in mind. Various
open source solutions, such as the Apache Knox Gateway2,
Apache Sentry3 and the Apache Accumulo4 framework, are
now emerging trying to address this void. Access control in
streaming systems was explored in [21], [22], but there does
not seem to be any equivalent solution for access control that
are stream processing oriented supporting latent data.
III. MOTIVATING USE CASE AND FOUNDATIONS OF
SPARKXS
In this section we will present a motivating use case in
the area of urban computing, and discuss the access control
primitives used in SparkXS. The policy-based access control
2http://knox.apache.org/
3http://sentry.incubator.apache.org/
4http://accumulo.apache.org/
is inspired by XACML, though the architectural design is
adapted to deal with the streaming nature of the data.
A. Motivating use case
Urban computing [23] is a paradigm that fits well with
the smart city vertical domain of the Internet of Things. This
research domain focuses on solutions for city-scale problems,
such as traffic congestion and air pollution, by leveraging
streaming big data produced by such smart city environments
to make better informed decisions. In our motivating use case,
we will leverage traffic flow information of taxis using the T-
Drive trajectory data set [24]. This data set contains about 15
million data points of 10357 taxis in a period of one week,
with for each taxi an individual file with GPS trajectories in
the following format:
#taxi id, date time, longitude, latitude
1,2008-02-02 15:36:08,116.51172,39.92123
1,2008-02-02 15:46:08,116.51135,39.93883
1,2008-02-02 15:46:08,116.51135,39.93883
1,2008-02-02 15:56:08,116.51627,39.91034
1,2008-02-02 16:06:08,116.47186,39.91248
This use case merely serves as a proof-of-concept as our
objective is to enable policy-based access control to streaming
data for a variety of stakeholders and circumstances. Assume
these 10357 taxis belong to different organizations, and that
all these data streams are processed by SparkXS. We want to
enforce the following diverse set of policies:
1) The admin of SparkXS has super-privileges to access all
streaming data of all taxis of all organizations.
2) Each taxi driver has full access to his own data stream,
but not to those of other taxi drivers.
3) Only taxi drivers of registered organizations are allowed
to upload their location data.
4) The call center has access between 7:00 AM and 6:00 PM
to location data of taxis that are waiting for passengers
(have not moved for 3 minutes).
5) The manager has access to taxi locations of his organi-
zation if his taxis cross the speed limit 50 km/h.
6) The call center has access to traffic and congestion info,
based on different taxis speeds on busy streets.
In the following subsections, we will elaborate how these
policies will be implemented and evaluated with attribute
based access control in SparkXS.
B. Foundations of Spark Streaming
Our framework is built on top of Apache Spark and its
Spark Streaming 5 extension. Spark has the advantage that it
provides one API for both batch and streaming computation. A
Resilient Distributed Dataset (RDD) is the storage abstraction
of Spark. As functions and computations on an RDD must
be idempotent and side-effect free, Spark can rebuild lost
data without replication by tracking the operations needed to
recompute the lost data.
5https://spark.apache.org/streaming/
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Spark Streaming processes streaming data as a series of
deterministic batch computations on small time intervals.
The basic abstraction of Spark Streaming is the Discretized
Stream (D-Stream), which is a continuous sequence of RDDs.
Spark Streaming receives live input data streams. If the time
interval ends, the corresponding batch of input data is stored
in a Resilient Distributed Dataset (RDD). The RDD is then
processed via Spark’s deterministic parallel operations, such as
filter(), map(), reduce() and foreach(), to produce a new batch
of processed data as an intermediate D-Stream of the program,
as depicted in Figure 1. Note, however, that no computation is
carried out on a D-Stream at runtime, unless a output operator
is called. For D-Streams, foreachRDD(func) is the fundamental
output operator that applies a function func to each RDD in
the stream. Output operators are the only ones that can have
side effects to print each RDD, save them to files, or transfer
each RDD over the network to subscribers.
In the following sections, we will elaborate on how we
implement access control with an additional layer on top of
D-Streams to avoid unauthorized access to both the original
and intermediate data streams (see Figure 2).
C. Key concepts of ABAC and XACML
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) is a paradigm that
grants access rights to users through the use of policies or rules
which combine various types of attributes. XACML is such
a policy-based and attribute-based access control standard. A
policy set in XACML represents a container of other policy
sets and policies (see Figure 3). A policy consists of zero
or more rules. Each rule can specify certain conditions as
additional constraints to determine whether a rule applies and
the desired effect (i.e. permit or deny). A policy set, policy
and rule can define a target which lists the conditions that
determine whether a policy applies to a particular request,
based on a set of attributes of:
• A resource defines the data, system component or service
to be accessed.
• The subject is the actor who makes a request to access a
certain resource.
• The action declares the operation (e.g. read, write, update,
delete) on the resource for which permission is requested.
• The environment is a set of attributes (independent of a
particular subject, resource or action) that are relevant to
an authorization decision.
Additionally, a policy set declares a policy combination
algorithm (e.g. permit overrides and deny overrides) and a
policy declares similar rule combination algorithm.
IV. ACCESS CONTROL IN SPARKXS
This section will elaborate how we used D-Streams to
implement access control to the different data streams in
Figure 2. Listing 1 illustrates how these D-Streams were
implemented using the Spark Streaming framework using
lambda expressions and map-reduce data processing methods.
A. Authentication of the subjects
Consider again the motivating use case in section 3.1. In the
policies, we identified 4 types of subjects with the following
usernames: admin, manager, taxi<id>, callcenter.
Before requesting access to a data stream, each user must
authenticate himself. Our implementation makes use of Forg-
eRock’s OpenAM identity and access management (IAM)
platform6. As part of the authentication step, SparkXS can
fetch and cache additional attributes, such as the role or the
organization of the manager and the taxi<id> users.
B. Authorizing access to data streams
Revisiting the 6 policies defined in section 3.1, access is
enforced based on 4 categories of attributes:
• Subject: The admin, the manager, the callcenter as well
as all the taxi drivers.
• Resource: The different D-Stream data streams as de-
picted in Figure 2.
• Action: Only the read and write operations in the policy
examples.
• Environment: The current time and working hours at the
call center.
These attributes are used in the request to decide on granting
access based on predefined set of policies.
In the following subsections, we will define the attribute-
based access control policies and rules that govern authoriza-
tion to access streaming data.
6http://openam.forgerock.org/
Listing 1. Definition of D-Streams for GPS trajectories and derived data streams
1 // Initialize the TaxiXS streaming application that processes data in batches of 10 second intervals.
2 SparkConf sparkConf = new SparkConf().setAppName(”TaxiXS”);
3 JavaStreamingContext ssc = new JavaStreamingContext(sparkConf, new Duration(10000));
4
5 // Process the taxi log files (sorted by time) with a custom data stream receiver.
6 JavaReceiverInputDStream<String> lines = ssc.receiverStream(new TaxiXS(”datastream.txt”));
7
8 // Parse ’comma separated value’ text line and convert it into a data object.
9 JavaDStream<Trajectory> gpslocations = lines.map(e −> parse(e));
10
11 // Group the GPS location entries in each batch per taxi id as waypoints for each 10 second time interval.
12 JavaPairDStream<String,Trajectory> waypoints = gpslocations.mapToPair(e −> new Tuple2<String,Trajectory>(e.taxi id, e));
13
14 // Compute the maximum speed for each 10 second time interval through pairwise reduction with a lambda function using the associative
15 // and commutative maxspeed() function, and select the second attribute of the resulting tuples.
16 JavaDStream<Trajectory> speed = waypoints.reduceByKey((a, b) −> maxspeed(a, b)).map(t −> t. 2);
17
18 // Filter taxis that drive too fast by selecting those location elements with a speed value that crosses the given threshold.
19 JavaDStream<Trajectory> speedingtaxi = speed.filter(e −> e.speed > 50);
20
21 // Compute for each 60 second time interval the maximum distance travelled during the past 180 seconds. The distance is again computed
22 // through pairwise reduction with the maxdistance() function. Filter those taxis that drove less than 10 meters during these 3 minutes.
23 JavaDStream<Trajectory> waitingtaxi = waypoints.reduceByKeyAndWindow((a, b) −> maxdistance(a, b), new Duration(180000),
24 new Duration(60000)).map(t −> t. 2).filter(e −> e.distance < 10);
25
26 // Group the taxi locations and speeds in each batch per street name.
27 JavaPairDStream<String,Trajectory> streets = speed.map(e−>addstreet(e)).mapToPair(e−>new Tuple2<String,Trajectory>(e.street, e));
28
29 // Filter busy streets where taxis drive at less than 10 km/h.
30 JavaDStream<Trajectory> busystreets = streets.reduceByKey((a, b) −> maxspeed(a, b)).map(t −> t. 2).filter(e −> e.speed < 10);
1) Policy 1: The admin of SparkXS has super-privileges to
access all streaming data of all taxis of all organizations. We
will use the following simplified syntax to express the policy:
1 if (subject.id == ’admin’) return Permit;
The decision to grant access only depends on the subject’s
attributes, and not on the content of the data stream (i.e. the
resource), allowing for efficient policy evaluation.
2) Policy 2: Each taxi driver has full access to his own
data stream, but not to those of other taxi drivers.
1 if ((action.type == ’read’) && (subject.role == ’taxidriver’))
2 return ConditionalPermit(e −> e.taxi id == subject.id);
As some streams contain data from different taxi drivers,
this policy returns a conditional permit that requires the
Policy Enforcement Point to execute additional filtering before
streaming out the data stream. In XACML terminology, this
additional filtering would be called an obligation.
3) Policy 3: Only taxi drivers of registered organizations
are allowed to upload their location data to SparkXS and
backend services.
1 if ((action.type == ’write’) && (subject.role == ’taxidriver’)
2 && ([ ’speedytaxi’, ’yellowcab’, ’airporttaxi’, ’limotaxis’ ].
3 contains(subject.organization)))
4 return Permit;
The organization attribute of the subject is assigned after
authentication of the user and fetched from the Policy Infor-
mation Point.
4) Policy 4: The call center has access between 7:00 AM
and 6:00 PM to location data of taxis that are waiting for
passengers (have not moved for 3 minutes).
1 if ((action.type == ’read’) && (subject.id == ’callcenter’)) {
2 if (environment.currtime < 7.00)
3 return Deny;
4
5 if (environment.currtime > 18.00)
6 return Deny;
7
8 if (resource.id = ’waitingtaxi’)
9 return Permit;
10 }
Rather than writing one long rule, we can decompose the
policy in individual smaller rules. The currtime attribute of
environment is computed automatically.
5) Policy 5: The manager has access to taxi locations of
his organization if his taxis cross the speed limit 50 km/h.
1 if ((action.type == ’read’) && (subject.role == ’manager’)) {
2 if (resource.id == ’speedingtaxi’)
3 return ConditionalPermit(e −> subject.organization ==
4 user(e.taxi id).organization);
5 }
This policy declares a conditional permit with additional
stream processing to filter speeding taxis that belong to a
particular organization. Note that this policy uses a function
user() to retrieve an individual’s cached attributes from the
Policy Information Point.
6) Policy 6: The call center has access to traffic and
congestion info, based on different taxis speeds on busy streets.
1 if ((action.type == ’read’) && (subject.id == ’callcenter’)) {
2 if (resource.id == ’busystreets’)
3 return Permit;
4 }
A more effective declaration of this policy would be to
combine it with Policy 4.
7) Default deny policy: A policy that we did not explicitly
listed before is the default deny policy that refuses unautho-
rized access:
1 return Deny;
This policy is enforced when no other policy applies, i.e. under
unspecified conditions.
C. Lazy processing of streaming data
Our proof-of-concept exposes the D-Streams as RESTful
interfaces with CRUD mappings. For example, to request read
access to the busystreets data stream, the user would initiate
the following HTTP GET request:
1 Read: http://host.com/taxixs/busystreets?token=AIC5wNT31
2
3 GET /taxixs/busystreets?token=AIC5wNT31 HTTP/1.1
4 Host: host.com
5 Accept: */*
The AIC5wNT31 parameter represents the random authenti-
cation token that binds the subject for subsequent operations
that require authentication and authorization. In practice, these
authentication tokens are much longer.
To upload GPS trajectories, the taxi driver would initiate a
HTTP POST request like the following:
1 Write: http://host.com/taxixs?token=AIC5wNT31
2
3 POST /taxixs?token=AIC5wNT31 HTTP/1.1
4 Host: host.com
5 Accept: */*
6 Content-type: application/text
7 Content-Length: 40
8
9 1,2008-02-02 15:36:08,116.51172,39.92123
The update and delete actions are not considered in the
previous examples, but follow the same mapping on HTTP
PUT and HTTP DELETE respectively.
After authentication, access to the different data streams
is enforced by the Policy Enforcement Point based on the
outcome of the Policy Decision Point. If read access is granted,
the foreachRDD() output operator is invoked on the requested
data stream.
1 // Print each RDD in the ’busystreets’ data stream
2 // foreachRDD() is output operator with side effects, no results
3 busystreets.foreachRDD(rdd −> {
4 System.out.println(”Busy Streets RDD: ” + rdd.id() + ” = ”
5 + rdd.collect());
6 return null;
7 });
In the above example, we invoke System.out.println() to pro-
duce the stream’s side effect. In our proof-of-concept, however,
we stream out the data in each RDD using HTTP Server-Sent
Events (SSE).
If there is no output operator like foreachRDD() applied on
the busystreets D-Stream, the preceding D-Streams (e.g. the
speed data stream) will not be computed. As such, the data
streams are processed in a lazy way, i.e. whenever access to
the data stream is requested and/or granted.
D. Parallel and distributed evaluation of access control poli-
cies with D-Streams
In the previous section we defined the policies using a sim-
plified syntax. In practice, the attribute-based access control
policies are converted into Java 8 lambda expressions and
map-reduce invocations for enhanced parallel evaluation on
distributed multi-core systems7.
Listing 2 gives a (partial) overview of the policy evaluation.
It illustrates a policy set policySet1 with 3 policies policy1, pol-
icy2 and defaultDeny (lines 14-17), and how this policy set is
applied on a request request1 (line 21) with a permitOverrides
combining algorithm (line 22).
The example above illustrates how we evaluate a single
request. To deal with a high-volume of access requests, we
combine and evaluate them as D-Streams of 0.5 second batch
intervals, i.e. they are grouped per 0.5 second intervals and
streamed as batches of RDDs that are then processed as
outlined earlier.
V. PERFORMANCE AND SCALABILITY
EVALUATION
We evaluated the streaming data motivating use case of
section 3 with the policy-based access control using the
policies of section 4.
A. Experimental setup
SparkXS makes use of Spark 1.0.1 and is built on top of
the Spark Streaming extension. SparkXS is run with JDK 8 so
that streaming computations and policy evaluations can make
use of efficient lambda expressions. We use an experimental
setup of 20 machines, each equipped with an Intel Core 2 Duo
3.00 GHz CPU and 4GB of memory. All machines are linked
to a 1 Gigabit network.
• 10 machines are used to host SparkXS in a cluster
configuration involving one master node for coordination
and 9 worker nodes.
• We use an additional 5 machines to simulate the GPS
trajectories of the taxi drivers using the T-Drive trajectory
data set [24].
• We use another 5 machines to initiate various data access
requests for the different data streams processed by the
SparkXS cluster.
The last 10 machines in fact simulate the load on the
SparkXS cluster setup. Each taxi driver uploads his current
location and requests write permission to do so. The other
stakeholders (callcenter, admin and manager) request read
permission to access certain D-Streams.
B. Methodology
To systematically compare the performance and scalabil-
ity results of different configurations under different loads
(i.e. growing number of taxi drivers), we benchmark 2 different
types of data streams, (a) the GPS location updates and derived
streams (see Figure 2), and (b) streams with access requests
to the former streams. A cluster of worker nodes will process
these records in RDD batches of 1 second. We increase the
load, i.e. the number of records per second, until the RDD has
too many elements to be processed in real-time. If processing
7http://openjdk.java.net/projects/lambda/
Listing 2. Parallel and distributed policy evaluation with Java 8 lambda expressions and map-reduce
1 enum Decision { Permit, Deny, NotApplicable, Indeterminate; }
2
3 @FunctionalInterface
4 interface Policy { Decision evaluate(Request r); }
5
6 public static Decision permit(boolean condition) { return condition ? Decision.Permit : Decision.NotApplicable; }
7 public static Decision deny(boolean condition) { return condition ? Decision.Deny : Decision.NotApplicable; }
8 public static Decision evaluate(Request request, List<Policy> policySet, BinaryOperator<Decision> combine) {
9 return policySet.parallelStream().map(p −> p.evaluate(request)).reduce(Decision.NotApplicable, combine); }
10
11 BinaryOperator<Decision> permitOverrides = (d1, d2) −> {
12 return (d1 == Decision.Permit || d2 == Decision.Permit ? Decision.Permit : (d1 == Decision.NotApplicable ? d2 : d1)); };
13
14 Policy policy1 = (req −> permit(req.subject.id.equals(”admin”)));
15 Policy policy2 = (req −> conditionalPermit(req.action.type.equals(”read”) && req.subject.role.equals(”taxidriver”),
16 (e −> e.taxi id.equals(req.subject.id))));
17 Policy defaultDeny = (req −> deny(true)));
18
19 List<Policy> policySet1 = new ArrayList<Policy>() {{ add(policy1); add(policy2); add(defaultDeny); }};
20
21 Request request1 = Request.parse(”{ ’subject’: { ’id’: ’admin’ }}”);
22 Decision decision1 = evaluate(request1, policySet1, permitOverrides);
Location updates/sec Minimum 25th %ile Median 75th %ile Maximum
1000 263 msec 292 msec 304 msec 322 msec 376 msec
2000 356 msec 376 msec 388 msec 399 msec 427 msec
4000 510 msec 527 msec 538 msec 544 msec 571 msec
6000 666 msec 677 msec 683 msec 692 msec 721 msec
8000 720 msec 746 msec 752 msec 757 msec 775 msec
10000 842 msec 852 msec 868 msec 895 msec 942 msec
12000 919 msec 934 msec 951 msec 966 msec 1014 msec
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Fig. 4. Processing time (median) in msec for location updates with 1, 2 and 4 workers
an RDD takes more than 1 second, then processing the next
batches will be delayed and this delay will keep on increasing.
C. Benchmarking the location streams
In a first experiment, we benchmark the scalability of Spark
Streaming as a baseline by measuring its performance for
processing the various data streams (see Figure 2) for a
growing number of taxi driver location updates. As a worst
case scenario, we enforce the explicit computation of the
intermediate data streams by calling the foreachRDD() output
operator on each of them. Table I shows a.o. the minimum,
median and maximum performance values for processing one
RDD on a single worker node. As input, it uses the log files of
the taxi drivers, merged and sorted by time. SparkXS processes
from 1000 up to 12000 lines of GPS locations per second. For
14000 location updates per second, we found the processing
could no longer be executed in real-time.
Figure 4 depicts the median processing times for the same
experiment with a growing number of worker nodes. Whereas
the processing time at 8000 updates per second was 752 msec
Access requests/sec Minimum 25th %ile Median 75th %ile Maximum
10000 85 msec 101 msec 104 msec 107 msec 129 msec
20000 82 msec 123 msec 127 msec 130 msec 183 msec
40000 156 msec 206 msec 211 msec 216 msec 247 msec
60000 218 msec 316 msec 331 msec 338 msec 405 msec
80000 318 msec 415 msec 466 msec 479 msec 500 msec
160000 768 msec 876 msec 989 msec 1086 msec 1352 msec
TABLE II
PROCESSING TIME BY 1 WORKER NODE FOR INCREASING NUMBER OF ACCESS REQUESTS PER SECOND
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Fig. 5. Processing time (median) in msec for access requests with 1, 2, 4 and 8 workers
for 1 worker node, the performance was 488 msec and 339
msec for 2 and 4 worker nodes respectively. The figure also
shows how SparkXS can easily process 32000 location updates
per second on 4 worker nodes in real-time at around 688 msec
per RDD.
D. Benchmarking the access request streams
The previous experiments illustrated the performance re-
sults for processing the GPS locations and intermediate data
streams. In the following experiments, we will measure the
impact of evaluating access control policies to these data
streams. We do so by issuing a mixture of access requests, and
have SparkXS evaluate them with the 6 policies mentioned in
section 4.2. Note that the performance results will be different
when either more or more complex access policies are used.
Table II lists the processing times for evaluation with access
requests on a single worker node. These performance numbers
reflect only the policy evaluation, and not the computation of
the intermediate data streams of Figure 2. A single node can
process up to 160000 access requests in real-time.
Figure 5 presents the results of similar experiments with up
to 8 worker nodes. This graph illustrates how SparkXS can
linearly scale with increasing number of access requests per
second. In the given example, 8 worker nodes can process
1280000 requests in real-time at around 892 msec per RDD.
E. Discussion
Comparing both tables for single worker node deployments,
we can observe that for this taxi driver use case, the capacity
results for the policy evaluation are more than a magnitude
higher than those for the actual location data streams. The
same observations can be made for multi-node worker de-
ployments.
In contrast to the XACML reference architecture, SparkXS
merges the functionality of the Policy Decision Point and Pol-
icy Enforcement Point to enforce access control to streaming
data in an efficient way. We can even further improve upon
these results by caching policy evaluation results, such that
e.g. write access requests for taxi drivers to upload their current
location are not continuously evaluated. However, we also
expect the processing time for access requests will increase
with a growing number of access control policies. The number
of policies can increase as long as they can be processed in
realtime, as otherwise the incoming events would need to be
buffered, which will fail when the system runs out of memory.
Figure 6 compares the amount of records (location updates
vs. access requests) can be processed by 1, 2 and 4 worker
nodes in 500 msec. This graph clearly shows the performance
overhead for processing access requests is minimal compared
to the location updates baseline.
In summary, the experimental results show that SparkXS
can enforce access control in a horizontally scalable way in
real-time and with minimal performance overheads. These
unique features make our SparkXS solution very well suited
for access control in an Internet of Things ecosystem. We
have looked for similar access control systems for streaming
applications, but beyond some works that do query rewriting
− a fundamentally different and less practical approach − we
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Fig. 6. Capacity comparison with multiple worker nodes given a 500 msec
processing time constraint
found no alternative solutions with which we could compare
the performance of SparkXS.
VI. CONCLUSION
Security and privacy are key challenges in the Internet
of Things, and there is a growing need for new enabling
technologies for access control that can handle the exponential
explosion and streaming nature of data in the Internet of
Things. In this paper, we presented SparkXS, an attribute-
based access control solution built on top of the Apache Spark
Streaming framework to enforce access control policies on
incoming and intermediate data streams. An additional benefit
is when access is not granted, the intermediate data stream is
not computed.
Experimental results in a worst case scenario with a mo-
tivating use case in the area of urban computing show that
SparkXS can enforce access control in a horizontally scalable
way in real-time and with minimal performance overheads.
The required capacity is less than 10% of the capacity needed
for the baseline computation for the intermediate data streams.
Future work will evaluate SparkXS on use cases with
more extensive access policies, and measure the performance
impact of different serialization mechanisms and replication
strategies. Due to the heterogeneous nature of IoT ecosys-
tems, we will explore trade-offs between scale-up (vertical
scalability) and scale-out (horizontal scalability). Additionally,
we will improve tool support such that policies defined as
lambda expressions can be easily modified and dynamically
and efficiently loaded at runtime through reflection.
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